Book Review: Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Ethics

New Natural Law Theory

Ever since Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle et al started defending Humanae Vitae using their ‘New Natural Law Theory’ (NNL), the debate about their school of thought has been one      of the defining issues in Natural Law writings. Is it an authentic presentation of St Thomas’ thought? Can, or cannot, you derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’? etc. It is thus to be expected that the Companion offers a summary and defence of the NNL, as Patrick Lee does ably. You would then expect a ‘Traditional Thomist’ (as they are usually called) to offer a presentation of the alternative. Sadly, however, the collection only offers this in what might be considered an implicit or indirect manner. I would have to consider this a significant omission in the collection. In addition, given that  so  much  Catholic  literature  on Natural Law has focused on issues of sexual morality, it is somewhat curious that this is not touched on in the articles.

How can we know moral truths?

The heart of the NNL-‘Traditional Thomist’ debate is one of epistemology: How do we know the Natural Law? Both sides of the debate agree we can know moral truths, but the two sides disagree as to how we can come to know these truths. ‘Traditional Thomists’ hold that “the basic moral criterion is human nature itself” (p.73): we know that good acts are good because we evaluate them as fulfilling the ends built into human nature. In manufacturing, a good watch is evaluated by whether it fulfils the telos of a watch: telling the time. In morality, a good act of eating is evaluated by whether is fulfils the inbuilt telos of eating: nourishment (with various secondary ends like social intercourse over meals). In contrast, we judge gluttonous eating to be sinful because it thwarts the telos of eating. We know the ‘ought’ by knowing the ‘is’: We know  moral  norms by knowing human nature with its various inbuilt ends and purposes. Such a teleological view of human nature will be familiar to those acquainted with the vision of the Faith magazine: evolution forms nature purposefully and we can know those purposes by knowing nature.

Basic human goods

The NNL approach, in contrast, argues that while morality is grounded in nature metaphysically our knowledge of morality is not dependent epistemologically on our knowledge of nature. “Knowledge of the natural law does not … begin with theoretical knowledge of human nature; rather, practical reason begins with its own, self-evident practical principles” (p.73). There are certain “basic human goods” that are self-evidently recognised and the task of moral analysis is to discern how to pursue these in a manner that is “open” to all the goods and exclusive of none. The eight goods are “incommensurable” (p.82) and cannot be ranked or pitted against each other. This, Lee argues, creates a system that defends “moral absolutes” (p.86). Lee’s articulation and defence of the NNL position is clear, well-defended, and as good as any exclusively-Catholic text- book might hope for.

Virtue

The less satisfying coverage in the Companion is its presentation of the non-NNL approach. Given that this is the approach more likely to interest Faith magazine readers, and given the wealth of scholarship by ‘Traditional Thomists’ in recent years, this might be considered somewhat disappointing. This said, there is an indirect comparison in that the Companion groups Lee’s article with one by Jennifer Frey on ‘Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism’. Frey draws on Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot to summarise the resurgence of the concept of ‘virtue’ as  the  paradigm  for moral analysis within certain secular academic circles. She writes, “Human beings… given the kind of kind they are, need and therefore ought to develop… virtues” (p.93), i.e. the ‘ought’ of behaviour is derived from the ‘kind’ of beings human are, their ‘is’. While not referring to the NNL per se, Frey’s article thus provides an epistemological foundation at variance with the NNL claim.